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COMMENT
Abortion Laws: A Constitutional Right to Abortion
Prior to 1967, a pregnant woman could not obtain an abortion in the
United States except when necessary to preserve her health or to save her
life.1 The policy, purpose, and effect of the statutes that occasioned this
state of affairs were questioned frequently by a concerned public.2 In-
creased public opinion precipitated a re-examination of abortion statutes
by several state legislatures,3 some of which ultimately adopted new abor-
tion laws allowing a pregnant woman to have an abortion in limited sit-
uations. 4 Recent judicial decisions, however, have cast doubt upon the
effectiveness and constitutionality of such statutes.
Statutory prohibition of abortion before quickening did not exist in
the United States prior to 1860.' At that time in our history medical
science was stymied by infections that made almost any surgery fatally
dangerous.6 When abortion statutes were enacted, they were justified as
necessary to protect pregnant women from the perils of surgery. In 1858,
one state court commented that its state abortion law was not to prevent
the procuring of abortions so much as to protect the life and health of the
mother against the possibly fatal consequences of an attempted abortion.1
Other reasons, however, have been suggested as support for the enactment
of abortion laws. Some writers theorize that they were part of a general
Victorian trend to legislate moral behavior.8 The preoccupation with sin
ISee, e.g., Hall, Abortion Laws: A Call for Reform, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 584
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Hall].
" Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis; Therapeutic Abortion
and the Law; Some New Approaches, 27 OHio ST. L.J. 647 [hereinafter cited as
Leavy & Kummer].
E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 41-303 (Supp. 1969); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§§ 25950-54 (West Supp. 1970); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50 to -53 (Supp.
1967); GA. CODE ANN. §26-1201 to -1203 (Rev. 1970); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3407 (Supp. 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-1 to -3 (Supp. 1969); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 465.110 (Supp. 1967).
' For an excellent general analysis of North Carolina's Therapeutic Abortion
Act, see Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Ad-
ministration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REv. 730 (1968).
L. LADER, ABORTIoN 86 (1966) [hereinafter cited as LADES].
'For a discussion of safety of a hospital abortion, see id. at 17-24.
" State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1858).
'Note, Abortion Reform: History, Statuts, and Prognosis, 21 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 521, 528 (1970).
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evident in the mid-nineteenth century demanded that an unmarried girl be
punished by displaying her transgression to the world.9 Abortion laws
thus were used to instill a fear of pregnancy among unmarried girls as a
means of enforcing morality.'0
The major disadvantage of older abortion laws is that they permit
abortion only in one situation-to save the life of the mother. These laws
do not consider the possibility that without an abortion permanent and
serious injury may be suffered. Also, by recognizing threats to the
mother's life only, such statutes increase the possibility that mentally
and/or physically defective children will be born. Moreover, by not
allowing abortion after rape or incest, and by failing to consider the
dilemma of a woman medically unable to use contraceptives, the statutes
contribute to the birth of many unwanted children for already congested
ghettos and overburdened orphanages and welfare agencies." It has also
been argued that these laws, promulgated on the theory of protecting a
woman's life, in reality promote more deaths because they create a thriving
illegal abortion business, preying upon desperate women who cannot meet
the standards necessary for a legal abortion."2
In a majority of states it is a felony to procure or attempt to procure
an abortion by any means, except when necessary to preserve the life of
the mother.'" There are a number of situations where especially forceful
reasons exist for allowing an abortion. These include rubella or thal-
idomide pregnancy, and pregnancy from rape or incest. Traditional
abortion statutes do not distinguish these special situations and in view
of the present state of medical science, serve little purpose other than
tying the hands of competent physicians. 14 In an attempt to conform
abortion laws to modern medical and surgical procedure, the American
Law Institute, in its Model Penal Code,5 provided a model statute as a
guideline to reform in state legislatures.' 6
LADER 89.
" Id. 90-91. See also G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LI FE AND THE CRIM-
iNAL LAw 154 (1957) ; Quay, Jistifiable Abortion--Medical and Legal Foundations
(pts. 1 & 2), 49 GEo. L.J. 173, 395 (1960).
"
1Note, 21 CAsE W. REs. L. R v., supra note 8.1 Id. at 529.
Leavy & Kummer at 647-53.
" Hall at 584.
1 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
The Model Penal Code provides that one who wilfully and without justifica-
tion aborts a pregnant woman during the first twenty-six weeks of pregnancy
commits a felony of the third degree. Beyond the twenty-sixth week, it is a felony
of the second degree. This illustrates the distinction based on the time of quicken-
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Beginning in 1967, public opinion stimulated several states17 to re-
examine their abortion laws in order to achieve conformity with medical
and surgical advances. The resulting reform legislation, commonly re-
ferred to as Therapeutic Abortion Acts, was based primarily upon the
Model Penal Code's criteria for legal abortion."8 Generally, the Ther-
apeutic Abortion Acts allow an abortion when necessary to protect the
life or health of the mother, when there is a substantial risk that the
child will be born defective, or if pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. 9
Such limited reform measures, however, have not quieted the public outcry
for complete reform. It has been suggested that the abortion situation
in the United States today, including the Therapeutic Abortion Acts, bears
ing, i.e., the stage of gestation at which the fetus becomes able to live outside the
mother's womb.
The model statute then allows an abortion by a licensed physician under the
following circumstances:
1) If the physician believes that there is a substantial risk to the mother's health
or that her mental health would severely deteriorate if pregnancy were to continue;
or
2) If that child would be born seriously crippled in mind or body; or
3) If the pregancy was the result of forcible rape or incest.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
'
7 Lucas, supra note 4, at 737.
18 North Carolina amended its law in 1967 to allow an abortion under the fol-
lowing circumstances:
1. When there is substantial risk that continuance of pregnancy would threaten
the life or gravely impair the health of the woman; or
2. When there is substantial risk that the child would be born with grave
physical or mental defect; or
3. When the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest and the rape was reported
to a law enforcement agency or court official within seven days; and
4. Only after the woman has given her written consent for the abortion to be
perfomed; if the woman is a minor or incompetent then only after permission is
given in writing by the parents, or if married, her husband, guardian, or person in
loco parentis to her; and
5. Only when the woman has resided in this state for at least four months prior
to the operation except in the case of an emergency where the life of the woman
is in danger; and
6. Only after three doctors, one of whom must be the person performing the
abortion, have examined the woman and certified in writing the circumstances
which they believe to justify the abortion; and
7. Only when the certificate has been submitted before the abortion to the
hospital where it is to be performed; provided that when there is an emergency, the
certificate may be submitted within twenty four hours after the abortion. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1969).
It should be noted that the residency requirement in the North Carolina statute
(as expressed in number 5 above) has recently been held unconstitutional by a
three-judge panel federal court. Corkey v. Edwards, - F. Supp. -, Civ. No. 2665
(W.D.N.C. Feb. 1, 1971).
" Leavy & Kummer at 654.
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a close resemblance to Prohibition, when the anti-liquor laws simply
decreased the quality and ready availability of alcohol, without abolishing
it.2° Arguably, the limited reform seen to date has only made the procure-
ment of an abortion by a licensed physician more readily available to the
wealthy, not to the poor. Those with economic means are able to fit them-
selves within the limited statutory categories or can afford to travel to
other countries or states where abortions have been legalized.21 Of course,
abortions are also available to the poor, but rarely legally. Abortion be-
fore quickening is generally considered to be safer than childbirth when
performed by a physician under hygienic hospital conditions.22 Under the
restrictive conditions imposed by most state abortion laws, however, the
safety of a hospital abortion is generally not available to the poor who
are unable to satisfy often arbitrary criteria.23 Impoverished women,
therefore, must either bear the unwanted child or abort it, either through
self-induced means or at the hands of a back-alley abortionist, either of
which may be fatally dangerous. 24 Although estimates and statistics are
difficult to substantiate,25 it is generally agreed that the death rate of
illegal abortions is significantly greater than the death rate of legal
abortions.26 Of the estimated eight thousand annual legal abortions, death
rarely results and ill after-effects are infrequent.27 By comparison, an esti-
mated 1.5 million illegal abortions annually result in five to ten thousand
deaths, most occurring among the poor.28
While Therapeutic Abortion Act reform measures may appear to be
a solution to the illegal abortion problem, they fail drastically. It has been
argued that eighty per cent of the abortions in the United States are
performed on married women, most of whom have several children, are
pregnant by their own husbands, and simply do not want other children.20
" Comment, Abortion Law Reform at a Crossroads, 46 Ci.-KENT L. Rzv.
102, 107 (1969).
2 See Ziff, Recent Abortion Law Reforms (Or Much Ado About Nothing),
60 J. CGlm. L.C. & P.S. 3, 11 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ziff].
"See, United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (D.D.C. 1969).
28 Gold, Therapeutic Abortion in New York City: 20-Year Review, 20 Ai. J.
PuB. HEALTir 968 (1965).
" D. LOWE, ABORTION AND THE LAw 26-39 (1966) [hereinafter cited as LowE].
2 E.g., Noonan, Amendnent of the Abortion Law: Relevant Data & Judicial
Opinion, 15 CATH. LAw. 124, 130-33 (1969).
28 Roy, Abortion: A Physician's View, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 391 (1970).
'
7 LADER 17.
2 See LowE 12-13.
2 Ziff at 13. It has been estimated that if every married woman of childbearing
age who did not want a pregnancy were using the most effective contraceptive
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Imposing such requirements as having a hospital panel determine who
will be permitted an abortion inevitably has the effect of continuing the
favorable position of the wealthy. The poorer, less educated woman is
often not sophisticated enough to manufacture the stories necessary to
bring her within the statutory conditions.3 Moreover many of the statu-
tory requirements are unrealistic. For example, these laws require that
in order to qualify for an abortion on grounds of rape, a woman must re-
port the incident to the police within one week after it occurred. It is
questionable whether many rape victims will risk the humiliation and
publicity that accompany such reports before knowing whether a preg-
nancy has in fact occurred.3 1
The main thrust of the current reform movement is based upon the
belief that a pregnant woman, in consultation with her physician, ought to
be allowed to decide for herself when pregnancy should be terminated,
and that a particular moral norm should not be forced upon society as
a whole.3 2 Legislative abortion liberalization, however, has not been
entirely successful.' The proponents of reform, therefore, have taken
their case to court in an attempt to have all restrictions upon the right
to abort declared unconstitutional. As the trend toward liberal interpreta-
tion of the Constitution has gathered momentum, proponents of abortion
reform supported by a wave of public sentiment, have met with increasing
success in the courts.3 4 The grounds for judicial attack have been vague-
ness,35 overbreadth, 0 and an inviolable constitutional right to decide
whether or not to bear children, 37 arising out of the marital right to
privacy. s
VAGUENESS
Early attacks on abortion laws met with little success. The usual
challenge was that the particular statute was void for vagueness. In People
available, there would still be two hundred and twenty thousand unplanned preg-
nancies each year. Roy, supra note 26, at 396.
30 Ziff at 14.
"
1 Hall at 588.
" Lucas, supra note 4, at 736.
8 For a discussion of the legislative reform of New York's abortion law, see
Hall, The Abortion Revolution, PLAvYoy, Sept. 1970, at 112.
"" See Moyers, Abortion Laws: A Study in Social Change, 7 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 237 (1970).
E.g., United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
88E.g., Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
E.g., Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
'8 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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v. Rankin,"9 the defendant claimed that the statutory phrase "to procure
the miscarriage of such woman,"" failed to sufficiently inform him with
reasonable certainty of the act prohibited, and was therefore uncon-
stitutionally vague. In upholding the statute, the court referred to the
legal dictionaries' definitions of the procurement of a miscarriage as the
criminal act of destroying a fetus before birth.4 The court held that the
statute was sufficiently clear to inform persons of common intelligence
and understanding of the acts that were prohibited.42
Other courts found sufficient clarity in abortion laws by referring
to the legislative history of the statutes.43 Arguably by having to support
the statutes' certainty by reference to extrastatutory material, these courts
indirectly confirmed a certain degree of vagueness in the statutes. Reason-
able men should be able to understand the statutory prohibitions upon
a reading of the statute alone.44 A statute requiring or forbidding the
performance of an act "in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must ncessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application vi-
olates the first essential requirement of due process of law."45
Illustrative of an abortion statute that suffered from the constitutional
infirmity of vagueness was the District of Columbia statute,4" which was
held unconstitutional in United States v. Vuitch.47 The statute in ques-
tion allowed an abortion only when "necessary for the preservation of
the mother's life or health. '48 According to the court, the word "health,"
being undefined, was so vague in both interpretation and practice that
uncertainty existed as to whether it included varying degrees of mental
as well as physical health. There was no clear standard to guide the
" 10 Cal. 2d 198, 74 P.2d 71 (1937).
40 CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1970).
1" 10 Cal. 2d at 202, 74 P.2d at 73.
42 Id.
"' Carter v. State, 155 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1963), appeal dismissed, 376 U.S. 648(1963); Kudish v. Board of Registration in Medicine, - Mass. -, 248 N.E.2d
264 (1969).
""See NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1964), and cases cited there-
in.
" Conally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). The Supreme Court
has stated that "no one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or property to
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451, 453 (1939).
"' D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967).
""305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
" D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967).
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physician, the jury, or the court.4 9 Thus, the phrase fails to give the cer-
tainty that due process of law demands in a criminal statute.
Other uncertainties in the phrase "as necessary for the preservation of
the mother's life or health" were challenged in People v. Beloa,50 and Roe
v. Wade,51 and in each case the court held the phrase to be unconstitu-
tionally vague. How likely must death be? Will the threat of suicide
satisfy the statutory exception? Is it sufficient if having the child will
shorten the life of the woman by a number of years? The court in Wade
concluded that these questions simply cannot be answered.
The vagueness test was applied to Georgia's abortion law in Doe v.
Bolton." The Georgia Abortion Act, a therapeutic act similar to the
North Carolina abortion law, was held to be unconstitutional in part,
because of overbreadth. The court held that a pregnant woman had a
constitutional right to decide for herself whether or not to bear children,
and that although the state may regulate the procedure, the statute went
too far by infringing upon that constitutional right.
In Babbitz v. McCann,53 although the Wisconsin abortion statute54 was
held to be unconstitutional on other grounds, the court rejected the vague-
ness attack. Fully aware of the constitutional guidelines, the court con-
cluded that the statute in question set forth with reasonable clarity and
sufficient particularity the kind of conduct that will constitute a viola-
tion.55
The vagueness attack was also rejected in Rosen v. Louisiana State
Board of Medical Examiners."8 The court held the Louisiana abortion
law5" to be reasonably comprehensible in its meaning and to provide fair
warning of what is prohibited.5" The court expressly rejected the de-
cisions of Wade, Below~s, and luitch.
"305 F. Supp. at 1034.
-0 Cal. 2d -, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
915 (1970).
"314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
'- F. Supp. -, Civ. No. 13676 (N.D. Ga. July 31, 1970).
"310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
Wis. STAT. ANqN. § 940.04 (1958). The Wisconsin Act was not a therapeutic
abortion statute.
"310 F. Supp. at 297.
"318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970).
'
7 The Louisiana law allows abortion only to save the life of the mother. LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285(6) (1950).
" The vagueness attack was also rejected in Corkey v. Edwards, - F. Supp.
-- Civ. No. 2665 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 1, 1971).
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An examination of the decisions dealing with the vagueness attack
reveals that the two groups of cases cannot be distinguished in fact or
law. Those cases accepting the attack appear to be concerned with the
practical and social problems involved with abortion regulation, whereas
those cases rejecting the vagueness argument refused to be influenced by
public opinion and social problems. The wide range of judicial disagree-
ment perhaps forewarns the reform movement to take another constitu-
tional route.
THE RIGHT TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO BEAR CHILDREN
In Olmstead v. United States," Justice Brandeis, dissenting, recognized
that the Constitution confers upon individuals, as against the government,
the right to be left alone. Indeed, this may well be "the most compre-
hensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 0 Stanley
v. Georgia"' recognized that "the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's pri-
vacy" 62 is a basic constitutional directive.
In a series of cases highlighted by Griswold v. Connecticut,3 the
Supreme Court has distinguished an area of fundamental human liberty in
matters relating to marriage, the family, and children.0 4 The protection of
the fourteenth amendment includes the right to marry," establish a
home,00 and the right to direct the upbringing and education of children,"7
which are among the basic civil liberties of man.
8
Proponents of abortion reform, based upon Griswold's pronouncement
of a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, argue that each woman
has a right to decide for herself whether or not to bear children with
which the state should not interfere.0 9 Griswold held that Connecticut's
birth control law unconstitutionally infringed upon the rights of Con-
necticut couples to practice contraception. The Court of Appeals for the
" 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).60 Id. at 478.
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
62Id. at 564.
63381 U.S. 479 (1965).
"For an expansion of the Griswold opinion, see, e.g., Note, Constitutional
Aspects of Present Criminal Abortion Laws, 3 VALP.xAiso U.L. Rav. 102 (1968).
"Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
"Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
"See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
"See, e.g., Hall, supra note 1. Contra, Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right
to Be Born, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 465 (1965).
[Vol. 49
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First Circuit has interpreted Griswold as establishing a right to use
birth control methods that may not be abridged by the legislature.70 In
Griswold, Justice Goldberg spoke of the "marital right to bear children
and raise a family." 71 The majority opinion recognized that this right to
privacy, whether it is derived from the first, fourth, ninth, fourteenth
amendment, or all of them, is a right "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 72
The court in United States v. Vnitch,73 holding the District of Colum-
bia abortion law void for vagueness, also discussed the right to decide
whether or not to bear children. Noting the indication in the Supreme
Court's decisions that the right of privacy extends to family relations, mar-
riage and sex matters, the court in Vuitch commented that the protected
privacy "may well include the right to remove an unwanted child at least
in the early stages of pregnancy."7 4 The court then encouraged Congress
to re-examine the statute in the light of current medical and legal condi-
tions.7" According to the court, it is legally imperative that uniform
medical abortion services be provided all segments of the population, the
poor as well as the rich.
In People v. BeloUs,76 the California Supreme Court concluded that
the fundamental right of a woman to choose whether or not to bear chil-
dren stems from the right of privacy in matters related to marriage, family,
and sex enunciated in Griswold. Because the right to determine whether
or not to bear children is not enumerated in either the federal or state
constitution does not mean that the right does not exist.77 Several un-
enumerated, but recognized, fundamental rights exist under the Constitu-
tion. For example, the right to vote," the right to travel,79 the right to
marry and procreates0 are basic, undeniable rights. None, however, are
specifically set forth in the Constitution.
The Wisconsin abortion statute, which allowed an abortion only to
0 Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398 (lst Cir. 1970).
11381 U.S. at 497.
" Id. at 487. For a comparison of the restrictions in Connecticut's birth control
statute and the restrictions in abortion statutes, see Leavy & Kummer at 674.
" 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969).
T
'Id. at 1035.
71 Id. at 1035-36.
" - Cal. 2d -, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
7 Id. at -, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
18 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
1 0Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) ; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116 (1958).
'0 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
19711
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
protect the life of the mother, was challenged in Babbitz v. McCann81 on
the ground that it violated a woman's fundamental right to decide for her-
self whether or not to bear children. The federal court, basing its opinion
upon Griswold and the ninth amendment, held that such a right exists
and that the Wisconsin law unconstitutionally infringed upon that right.
The state may not deprive a woman of her private choice82 of whether
or not to bear an unquickened fetus.83 Conception and bearing children
are closely interwoven with the intimacy of home and marriage.84 Fol-
lowing Griswold, the court pointed out that the Bill of Rights contains
both penumbral and specific guarantees that protect one's home and life
from governmental intrusion. 5
Georgia's Therapeutic Abortion Law," similar to the North Carolina
statute, was held unconstitutional in part by a federal court in Doe v.
Bolton.8 7 The right to privacy, according to the court, includes the right
to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. That right, however, is not un-
limited. The court held that the state may not unduly limit the reasons
for which an abortion will be allowed. But it may legitimately require
that the decision to terminate a pregnancy be reached only upon con-
sideration of more factors than the desires of the woman and her ability
to find a willing physician. The state, for example, may require family
counseling or the consent of a physician so long as such requirements do
not restrict the reasons for the initial decision, and do not violate the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.88
The courts in Belous, Babbitz, and Bolton had little difficulty in finding
a fundamental right to decide privately not to bear children. The court in
Roe v. Wade89 also recognized that freedom of choice as concerns abor-
tions is a fundamental right. In determining what rights are fundamental,
however, judges are not allowed to decide cases in light of their personal
and private notions. Instead they must look to the traditions and collec-
tive conscience of society to determine whether the principle is so rooted
81 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
"Justice Douglas, writing in Griswold, asserted that the principles of the right
to privacy apply to "all governmental invasions 'of the sancity of a man's home
and privacies of life."' 381 U.S. at 484, citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886).
310 F. Supp. at 299.
"Id.
"Id. at 300.
88 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1201 to -1203 (Rev. 1970).
- F. Supp. -, Civ. No. 13676 (N.D. Ga. July 31, 1970).
88- F. Supp. at -.
"314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
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therein as to be classified as fundamental. ° Other courts have concluded
that the abortion problem is a question about which reasonable men dis-
agree and therefore is not so rooted in our traditions and collective con-
science so as to be classified as fundamental."
Louisiana's abortion law92 was expressly held to be constitutional by a
federal court in Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners."
The statute indirectly allows an abortion only when necessary to save the
mother's life.9" According to Rosen, biologically and genetically speak-
ing, abortion involves the destruction of a form of life.95 Generally, when
the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive.96 The court in Rosen therefore concluded that there
is no fundamental right to an abortion since such a right is not so rooted
in the traditions and collective conscience of our people that it must be
ranked as fundamental.9 7 Such a conclusion, however, is of questionable
validity. Certainly before Griswold there was widespread public disagree-
ment over the practice of birth control. And the Connecticut legislature
had spoken. Yet the Supreme Court found that the statute still violated
a fundamental right of privacy. The reasoning of Rosen, therefore, is no
barrier to finding the presence of a fundamental right not previously ex-
pressed by a particular court or legislature.
The court in Rosen also based its decision upon the principal of con-
stitutional law that the federal courts will not strike down an otherwise
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged wrongful legislative mo-
tive. 8 Perhaps this was a judicial response to the attack that the statutory
purpose of protecting the health of the mother is no longer valid due to
0 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
" In Doe v. Scott, - F.2d -, Civ. No. 18382 (7th Cir. March 30, 1970), the
court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining Illinois from prosecuting
a physician under the abortion statute if he terminates the current pregnancy of the
intervening plaintiff. Other courts, however, have refused to hear abortion law chal-
lenges. A federal court employed the abstention doctrine in Rodgers v. Dansforth,
- F. Supp. -, Civ. No. 18360-2 (W.D. Mo., Sept. 10, 1970), to refuse to accept
jurisdiction of an attack upon Missouri's abortion law. A similar course of action
was taken in Doe v. Randall, - F. Supp. -, Civ. No. 3-70-97 (D. Minn. May 19,
1970), in refusing to entertain an attack upon the Minnesota abortion law.
"
2 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (Supp. 1970).
08318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970).
9"LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285(6) (1950).
"0318 F. Supp. at 1222.
0 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
"
TThis is the test of a fundamental right expressed by the Supreme Court in
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
"
0See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) ; McCray v. United
States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
1971]
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modem and safe abortion procedures. It was also held that a federal court
should not void legislation, which a state had the power to enact on more
than one ground, simply because the alleged dominant motive behind
the statute is no longer served by its application." Both of these arguments
by the court, however, become relevant only after concluding that there
is no constitutional right involved that demands protection. Therefore,
had the court concluded that the state could not constitutionally regulate
a woman's private choice of abortion, these latter two issues would be of
no consequence since such principles could not save the statute from
unconstitutionality.
If a fundamental right not to bear children exists, as an increasing
number of courts have so held, the more critical issue is whether the state
has a compelling interest in the regulation of a subject that falls within
its police power.
THE STATE'S INTEREST IN REGULATION OF ABORTIONS
Where a statute significantly encroaches upon personal liberty, the
"State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which
is compelling."' In Shelton v. Tucker,'0 the Supreme Court held that
even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose canont be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundmental per-
sonal interests when the end can be more narrowly achieved. 0 2 The
breadth of the legislative abridgement must be viewed in light of less
drastic means for achieving the same purpose. Therefore, if the state's
interest and purpose is the safety of the mother, 03 this reasoning would
make an abortion lawful where it is safer than childbirth. 10 4
In Babbitsz v. McCann,'05 the defendant urged that the state had a
compelling interest in protecting the fetus. The court held, however, that
the woman's right to refuse to carry a fetus during the early months of
pregnancy may not be invaded by the state without a more compelling
state interest than protecting the fetus.'0 6 Of particular interest is the
" 318 F. Supp. at 1228.
... Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
-1364 U.S. 479 (1960).
... See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
10. See Comment, 46 CHi.-KENT L. Rv., supra note 20.
... Such reasoning, however, would place the final decision of whether to abort
solely upon the attending physician, rather than the pregnant woman.
10' 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
1°0 Id. at 301.
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fact that the court also found no compelling state interest in the need
to protect the mother's life, basing its conclusion on the assertion that
a medical abortion during early pregnancy is not inherently danger-
ous to the mother. Furthermore, the court could find no compelling
state interests in using the abortion laws to discourage pre-marital sexual
intercourse. 07
The state clearly has no valid, subordinating interesting in preventing
the use of -birth control methods.'08 Moreover, the same policy would
dictate the conclusion that the state has no legitimate interest in pro-
hibiting therapeutic abortions. If a woman practices birth control but
nevertheless becomes pregnant, should she not be allowed to use the final,
and most effective, method of birth control? It is asserted that if every
married woman of childbearing age who did not wish to become pregnant
(an estimated twenty-two to twenty-five million) were to use the most
effective contraceptive available, there would still be 220,000 unplanned
pregnancies each year.'09
The intra-uterine device (IUD) is a common method of birth control.
There is at least a possibility that the IUD does not prevent fertilization
of an ovum, but rather prevents a fertilized ovum from attaching to the
uterine wall. If this is the case, then the practical difference between
the IUD and an abortion is difficult to discern. The same argument may
apply to the "morning-after" pill. Indeed, former Supreme Court Justice
Clark has asserted:
[O]ne of the basic values of [the right to] privacy is birth control,
as evidenced by the Griswold decision. Griswold's act was to prevent
formation of the fetus. This, the Court found, was constitutionally
protected. If an individual may prevent conception, why can he not
nullify that conception when prevention has failed ?110
Those who oppose judicial reform of abortion laws maintain that the
fetus has a constitutionally protected right to be born, or that the legis-
lature may properly grant such a right."' Courts have clearly extended
certain rights to the fetus: the right of inheritance,1 2 and the right to
107 Id.
10 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
... Roy, supra note 26, at 396.
110 Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A Constituitonal Appraisal, 2
LOYOLA U.L.A.L. REv. 1, 9 (1969).
... See, e.g., Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right to Be Born, 17 W. REs. L.
REv. 465 (1965).
. ATKINSON, WILLs 75 (2d ed. 1953).
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compensation for tortious injury" 3 sustained during the prenatal stage.11 4
At least one school of thought argues that a viable fetus is a person entitled
to full protection." 5 Support for this position is found in two lower court
cases. In Hatala v. Markiewicz," 6 the Connecticut court held that life
begins at conception. And an Ohio court in Williams v. Marion Rapid
Transit, Inc.,1 .7 determined that a viable fetus is a person under the Ohio
Constitution. Thus, the argument goes, allowing abortions for reasons
other than to save the mother's life would deprive the fetus of life without
due process of law.
On the other hand, it has been urged that the fetus has no constitutional
right to be born." 8 This argument notes that no case has extended the
fourteenth amendment to protect the rights of the unborn.1 The point
at which a fetus becomes a "person" will always be the subject of philo-
sophical and religious discussion. However, it is interesting to note that
no state requires a death certificate for the death of a fetus prior to the
twentieth week of pregnancy.120
In Corkey v. Edwards,'21 a federal court upheld North Carolina's
Therapeutic Abortion Act as constitutional. The court did not recognize
the fetus as having a constitutional right to be born, but did hold that the
state has a compelling interest in protecting the fetus and therefore the
*legislature may grant such a right. Other cases, Babbitz, Bolton, and
Belos have held to the contrary.
Once again, the conflicting cases cannot be distinguished in fact or in
law. One can only conclude that the reason for the conflicting opinions is
the personal constitutional beliefs of the judges who heard the cases.
The conflict, it seeems, can only be resolved by the Supreme Court.
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
It has been maintained that the proper forum for abortion reform is
the legislature rather than the judiciary. Traditionally, however, legis-
lative changes in abortion laws have not been substantial. Even if the
1 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 354-57 (3d ed. 1964).
"" Even the opponents, however, disagree as to whether this asserted right
extends to a non-viable, as well as a viable fetus.
. See, e.g., Note, 3 VALPARAISO U.L. REv., sitpra note 64, at 107-09.
1.6 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
1" 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
.. See, Note, 3 VALPARAiso U.L. REv., supra note 64, at 107-09.
119 Id.20 See Note, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 59 (1969).
"'- F. Supp. -, Civ. No. 2665 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 1, 1971).
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asserted constitutional right not to bear children is ultimately rejected by
the Supreme Court, it is necessary that state legislatures re-examine their
abortion laws in light of continuing medical advancements and the call for
legalized abortions by substantial segments of the population. Approx-
imately four years ago the hue and cry for abortion reform resulted in the
passage of many therapeutic abortion acts, as in North Carolina. Those
liberalizations, however, have failed largely because of their restrictions,
many of which are of questionable constitutional validity. Today, reform
demands complete legalization of abortions performed by a physician in a
hospital. Several states have brought their abortion laws in line with
modern social and medical conditions. Alaska,
1 22 Hawaii,'2 Maryland,' 4
New York,125 and Washington 12 now allow abortions almost at will.
Certainly more states will follow the lead. However, any reform effort can
be expected to encounter the same objections that faced the recent New
York enactment. Perhaps many of the objections to legislative reform will
be overshadowed when the effect of the New York law is taken into
account by any legislature contemplating reform.
A major objection offered in the New York legislature was that
reform would turn the state into an "abortion mill." In the six month
period from July 1970 to January 1971, an estimated 150,000 legal
abortions were performed in the state of New York. 2 7 Of the sixty-nine
thousand abortions performed in New York City during the six-month
period, one-half of those women were from outside the state of New York.
Undeniably, this is a substantial increase apparently strengthening the
position of those who oppose reform. But such is not the case. Instead,
the increase in the number of abortions legally performed dramatically
illustrates that reform was needed in order to bring the law into conformity
with social needs and conditions. Furthermore, the legalization of abortion
has reduced the abortion death rate substantially below that experienced
when women were forced to utilize illegal means. 2 ' Legalization, there-
fore, has accomplished the primary purpose that restrictive abortion laws
sought to achieve, i.e., protection of the life and safety of a pregnant
woman.
... PLAYBOY, Sept. 1970, at 150.
.
8 T mE, Mar. 9, 1970, at 34.
2" Moyers, Abortion Laws: A Study in Social Change, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
237, 239-40 n.28 (1970).
... Durham Morning Herald, Jan. 17, 1971, § B, at 8, col. 2.
Id. § B, at 8, col. 6.
Id. at col. 3.128 Id. at col. 5.
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Many state legislatures in the future will observe with interest the
effects of abortion legalization in those states that have taken the lead. In
the state of Washington, legalization of abortion was approved in a
referendum by fifty-five per cent of those citizens voting. Perhaps other
states should submit the question to the people.'20 The legislators should
not allow their own religious and moral opinions, which inevitably arise
in any discussion of abortion reform, to influence their obligation to
examine any law that may promote the public interest.
CONCLUSION
The present controversy over abortion reform is one of the most sig-
nificant issues in the United States today. The degree of discontent dem-
onstrates that reform is necessary and is indeed inevitable. The only
question remaining is the mechanism for reform-the court or the legis-
lature. If the legislature does not recognize the problem and re-evaluate
the abortion laws, then the recent increase in judicial examination of those
laws can be expected to continue. Recognizing that the state has a valid
and compelling interest in reasonably regulating abortion procedures, it
appears that the state should not attribute to a fetus rights superior to
that of the pregnant woman, thereby interfering with her fundamental right
to privacy in matters relating to marriage and sex.
Reform is needed not only from a legal standpoint, but also because
of social ills occasioned by a substantial number of unwanted children.
An unwanted child may develop psychological problems due to lack of
security and parental love. Juvenile delinquency is often a desperate
attempt to gain attention not available in the home. Planned parenthood
is within the best interests of society and should be a primary concern of the
legislature. All the common methods of birth control, however, cannot
solve the problem. Only legalized abortion will achieve the needed result.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court must hear and decide the merits of the
constitutional attacks. No matter what course is followed,"' it seems that
the writing is on the wall, so to speak, and the legislatures should seize the
opportunity to re-examine their laws before the courts require them to do
SO.
RICKY L. WELBORN
.. Id. at col. 6.
1. A unique and interesting attack upon the abortion laws was made in Comment,
Isolating The Male Bias Against Reform of Abortion Legislation, 10 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 301 (1970).
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